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Abstract
Action models are semantic structures similar to Kripke models that represent a
change in knowledge in an epistemic setting. Whereas the language of action model
logic [8,7] embeds the semantic structure of an action model directly within the lan-
guage, this paper introduces a language that represents action models using syntactic
operators inspired by relational actions [11,12,13]. This language admits an intu-
itive description of the action models it represents, and we show in several settings
that it is sufficient to represent any action model up to a given modal depth and to
represent the results of action model synthesis [19], and give a sound and complete
axiomatisation in some of these settings.
Keywords: Modal logic, Epistemic logic, Doxastic logic, Temporal epistemic logic,
Multi-agent system, Action model logic
1 Introduction
Dynamic epistemic logic describes the way knowledge can change in multi-
agent systems subject to informative actions taking place. For example, if Tim
were to announce “I like cats”, then everyone in the room would know the
proposition Tim likes cats is true, and furthermore, everybody would know
that this fact is common knowledge among the people in the room. This
simple informative action is what is referred to as a public announcement [23],
and such actions of these have been extensively studied in epistemic logics.
More complex actions can include private announcements (where some agents
are oblivious to the informative action occurring), or a group announcement
(where members of a group simultaneously make a truthful announcement to
every other member of the group [1]). These complex actions may be modelled
and reasoned about using action models [8] which are effectively a semantic
model of the change caused by an informative action. Consequently they are
very useful for reasoning about the consequences of an informative action, but
less well suited to reasoning about the action itself.
1 Acknowledges the support of the Prescott Postgraduate Scholarship.
2 A composable language for action models
We present a language for describing epistemic actions syntactically. Com-
plex actions may be built as an expression upon simpler primitive actions.
This approach is a generalisation of the relational actions introduced by van
Ditmarsch [12]. We show in several settings that this language is sufficient to
represent any informative action represented by an action model (up to a given
model depth), we present a synthesis result, and give a a sound and complete
axiomatisation for some of these settings. The synthesis result is an important
application of this work: given a desired state of knowledge among a group of
agents, we are able to compute a complex informative action that will achieve
that particular knowledge state (given it is consistent with the current knowl-
edge of agents). We provided these results in a variety of modal logics suited
to epistemic reasoning: K , K45 and S5 .
Example 1.1 James, Ed and Tim submit a research grant proposal, and ea-
gerly await the outcome. Is there a series of actions that will result in:
(i) Ed knowing the grant application was successful;
(ii) James not knowing whether the grant application was successful, but
knowing that either Ed or Tim does know;
(iii) Tim does not know whether the grant application was successful, but
knows that if the grant application was unsuccessful, then James knows
that it was unsuccessful.
Such an epistemic state may be achieved by a series of messages: Ed is
sent a message congratulating him on a successful application, James is sent
a message informing him that at least one applicant on each grant has been
informed of the outcome, and Tim is sent a message informing him that the
first investigator of all unsuccessful grants has been notified.
After establishing some technical preliminaries (Section 2) we present a syn-
tactic approach for describing informative actions (Sections 3 and 4), provide
a sound and complete axiomatisation of the language (Section 5) and provide
a correspondence result between this language and action models (Section 6),
give a computational method for synthesising actions to achieve an epistemic
goal (Section 7).
2 Technical Preliminaries
We recall definitions from modal logic, the action model logic of Baltag, Moss
and Solecki [8,7] the refinement modal logic of van Ditmarsch, French and
Pinchinat [14,15] and the arbitrary action model logic of Hales [19].
Let P be a non-empty, countable set of propositional atoms, and let A be
a non-empty, finite set of agents.
Definition 2.1 [Kripke model] A Kripke model M = (S,R, V ) consists of a
domain S , which is a non-empty set of states (or possible worlds), an accessibil-
ity function R : A→ P(S ×S), which is a function from agents to accessibility
relations on S , and a valuation function V : P → P(S), which is a function
from states to sets of propositional atoms.
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The class of all Kripke models is called K . A multi-pointed Kripke model
MT = (M,T ) consists of a Kripke model M along with a designated set of
states T ⊆ S .
We write Ra to denote R(a). Given two states s, t ∈ S , we write sRat to
denote that (s, t) ∈ Ra. We write TRa to denote the set of states {s ∈ S | t ∈
T , tRas} and write RaT to denote the set of states {s ∈ S | t ∈ T , sRat}. We
writeMs as an abbreviation forM{s}, and write tRa and Rat as abbreviations
for {t}Ra and Ra{t} respectively. As we will often be required to discuss
several models at once, we will use the convention that MT = ((S,R, V ), T ),
M ′T ′ = ((S
′, R′, V ′), T ′), MγTγ = ((S
γ , Rγ , V γ), T γ), etc.
Definition 2.2 [Action model] Let L be a logical language. An action model
M = (S,R, pre) with preconditions defined on L consists of a domain S, which
is a non-empty, finite set of action points, an accessibility function R : A →
P(S × S), which is a function from agents to accessibility relations on S, and
a precondition function pre : S → L , which is a function from action points to
formulae from L .
The class of all action models is called AM . A multi-pointed action model
M
T
= (M,T) consists of an action model M along with a designated set of
action points T ⊆ S.
We use the same abbreviations and conventions for action models as are
used for Kripke models. We use the convention of using sans-serif fonts for
action models, as in M
T
and italic fonts for Kripke models, as in MT .
In addition to the class K of all Kripke models, and the class AM of all
action models we will be referring to several other classes of Kripke models and
action models.
Definition 2.3 [Classes of Kripke models and action models] The class of
all Kripke models / action models with transitive and Euclidean accessibility
relations is called K45 / AM K45 .
The class of all Kripke models / action models with serial, transitive and
Euclidean accessibility relations is called KD45 / AM KD45 .
The class of all Kripke models / action models with reflexive, transitive and
Euclidean accessibility relations is called S5 / AM S5 .
Definition 2.4 [Language of arbitrary action model logic] The language L⊗∀
of arbitrary action model logic is inductively defined as:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | aϕ | [MT ]ϕ | ∀ϕ
where p ∈ P , a ∈ A, and M
T
∈ AM is a multi-pointed action model with
preconditions defined on the language L⊗∀.
We use all of the standard abbreviations for propositional logic, in addition
to the abbreviations ✸aϕ ::= ¬a¬ϕ, 〈MT〉ϕ ::= ¬[MT ]¬ϕ, and ∃ϕ ::= ¬∀¬ϕ.
We also use the cover operator of Janin and Walukiewicz [22], following the
definitions given by Bı´lkova´, Palmigiano and Venema [9]. The cover operator,
∇aΓ is an abbreviation defined by ∇aΓ ::= a
∨
γ∈Γ γ ∧
∧
γ∈Γ✸aγ, where Γ ⊆
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L⊗∀ is a finite set of formulae. We note that the modal operators a, ✸a and
∇a are interdefineable as aϕ↔ ∇a{ϕ} ∨∇a∅ and ✸aϕ↔ ∇a{ϕ,⊤}. This is
the basis for the axiomatisations of refinement modal logic and arbitrary action
model logic, and plays an important part in our correspondence and synthesis
results. This was previously used as the basis of several axiomatisations of
refinement modal logics [15,20,18,21,10,19].
We refer to the language L⊗ of action model logic, which is L⊗∀ without the
∀ operator, the language L∀ of refinement modal logic, which is L⊗∀ without
the [M
T
] operator, the language L of modal logic, which is L⊗ without the
[M
T
] operator, and the language L0 of propositional logic, which is L without
the a operator.
Definition 2.5 [Semantics of modal logic] Let C be a class of Kripke models
and let M = (S,R, V ) ∈ C be a Kripke model. The interpretation of ϕ ∈ L in
the logic C is defined inductively as:
Ms  p iff s ⊆ V (p)
Ms  ¬ϕ iff Ms 2 ϕ
Ms  ϕ ∧ ψ iff Ms  ϕ and Ms  ψ
Ms  aϕ iff for every t ∈ sRa :Mt  ϕ
MT  ϕ iff for every t ∈ T :Mt  ϕ
Definition 2.6 [Bisimilarity of Kripke models] Let M = (S,R, V ) ∈ K and
M ′ = (S′, R′, V ′) ∈ K be Kripke models. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S′
is a bisimulation if and only if for every a ∈ A and (s, s′) ∈ R the following
conditions hold:
atoms For every p ∈ P : s ∈ V (p) if and only if s′ ∈ V ′(p).
forth-a For every t ∈ sRa there exists t
′ ∈ s′R′a such that (t, t
′) ∈ R.
back-a For every t′ ∈ s′R′a there exists t ∈ sRa such that (t, t
′) ∈ R.
If (s, s′) ∈ R then we call Ms and M
′
s′ bisimilar and write Ms↔M
′
s′ .
Proposition 2.7 The relation ↔ is an equivalence relation on Kripke models.
Proposition 2.8 Let Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ K be Kripke models such that Ms↔M
′
s′ .
Then for every ϕ ∈ L: Ms  ϕ if and only if M
′
s′  ϕ.
These are well-known results.
Definition 2.9 [n-bisimilarity of Kripke models] Let n ∈ N, and let Ms =
((S,R, V ), s) ∈ K and M ′s′ = ((S
′, R′, V ′), s′) ∈ K be Kripke models. We say
that Ms is n-bisimilar to M
′
s′ , and write Ms↔nM
′
s′ , if and only if for every
a ∈ A the following conditions hold:
atoms For every p ∈ P : s ∈ V (p) if and only if s′ ∈ V ′(p).
forth-n-a If n > 0 then for every t ∈ sRa there exists t
′ ∈ s′R′a such that
Mt↔(n−1)M
′
t′
back-n-a If n > 0 then for every t′ ∈ s′R′a there exists t ∈ sRa such that
Mt↔(n−1)M
′
t′
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Definition 2.10 [Modal depth] Let ϕ ∈ L . The modal depth of ϕ, written as
d(ϕ), is defined recursively as follows:
d(p) = 0 for p ∈ P
d(¬ψ) = d(ψ)
d(ψ ∧ χ) =max(d(ψ), d(χ))
d(aψ) = 1 + d(ψ)
Proposition 2.11 The relation ↔n is an equivalence relation on Kripke mod-
els.
Proposition 2.12 Let n ∈ N and let Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ K be Kripke models such that
Ms↔nM
′
s′ . If m < n then Ms↔mM
′
s′ .
Proposition 2.13 Let n ∈ N and let Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ K be Kripke models such that
Ms↔nM
′
s′ . Then for every ϕ ∈ L such that d(ϕ) ≤ n: Ms  ϕ if and only if
M ′s′  ϕ.
Proposition 2.14 Let Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ K be Kripke models. Then Ms↔M
′
s′ if and
only if for every n ∈ N: Ms↔nM
′
s′ .
These are well-known results.
Definition 2.15 [B-bisimilarity of Kripke models] Let Ms = ((S,R, V ), s) ∈
K and M ′s′ = ((S
′, R′, V ′), s′) ∈ K be Kripke models. We say that Ms is
B-bisimilar to M ′s′ , and write Ms↔BM
′
s′ , if and only if for every b ∈ B the
following conditions hold:
atoms For every p ∈ P : s ∈ V (p) if and only if s′ ∈ V ′(p).
forth-b For every t ∈ sRb there exists t
′ ∈ s′R′b such that Mt↔M
′
t′ .
back-b For every t′ ∈ s′R′b there exists t ∈ sRb such that Mt↔M
′
t′ .
Definition 2.16 [B-restricted formulae] Let B ⊆ A. A B-restricted formula
is defined by the following abstract syntax:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | bψ
where p ∈ P , b ∈ B, ψ ∈ L .
Proposition 2.17 Let B ⊆ A, and Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ K be Kripke models such that
Ms↔BM
′
s′ . Then for every ϕ ∈ L such that ϕ is is a B-restricted formula:
Ms  ϕ if and only if M
′
s′  ϕ.
This result is trivial.
We recall the semantics of action model logic of Baltag, Moss and
Solecki [8,7].
Definition 2.18 [Semantics of action model logic] Let C be a class of Kripke
models, let M = (S,R, V ) ∈ C be a Kripke model and let M ∈ AM be an
action model.
We first define action model execution. We denote the result of executing
the action model M on the Kripke modelM asM ⊗M, and we define the result
as M ⊗M =M ′ = (S′, R′, V ′) where:
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S′ = {(s, s) | s ∈ S, s ∈ S,Ms  pre(s)}
(s, s)R′a(t, t) iff sRat and sRat
(s, s) ∈ V ′(p) iff s ∈ V (p)
We also define multi-pointed action model execution as MT ⊗MT =M
′
T ′ =
((S′, R′, V ′), T ′) = ((M ⊗M), (T × T) ∩ S′).
Then the interpretation of ϕ ∈ L⊗ in the logic C⊗ is the same as its in-
terpretation in the modal logic C given in Definition 2.5, with the additional
inductive case:
Ms  [MT ]ϕ iff Ms ⊗MT ∈ C implies Ms ⊗MT  ϕ
Definition 2.19 [Sequential execution of action models] LetM,M′ ∈ AM . We
define the sequential execution of M and M′ as M ⊗M′ = M′′ = (S′′,R′′, pre′′)
where:
S′′ = S × S′
(s, s′)R′′a(t, t
′) iff sRat and s
′R′at
′
pre′′((s, s′)) = 〈M
s
〉pre′(s′)
We also define sequential action of M
T
and M′
T′
as M
T
⊗ M′
T′
= M′′
T′′
=
((S′′,R′′, pre′′),T × T′).
Definition 2.20 [Bisimilarity of action models] LetM = (S,R, pre) ∈ AM and
M′ = (S′,R′, pre′) ∈ AM be action models. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S′
is a bisimulation if and only if for every a ∈ A and (s, s′) ∈ R the following
conditions hold:
atoms ⊢ pre(s)↔ pre′(s′)
forth-a For every t ∈ sRa there exists t
′ ∈ s′R′a such that (t, t
′) ∈ R.
back-a For every t′ ∈ s′R′a there exists t ∈ sRa such that (t, t
′) ∈ R.
If (s, s′) ∈ R then we call M
s
and M′
s′
bisimilar and write M
s
↔M′
s′
.
Proposition 2.21 The relation ↔ is an equivalence relation on action models.
Proposition 2.22 Let Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ K be Kripke models such that Ms↔M
′
s′ .
and let M
s
,M′
s′
∈ AM be action models such that M
s
↔M′
s′
. Then (Ms ⊗
Ms)↔(M
′
s′ ⊗M
′
s′
).
Proposition 2.23 Let Ms ∈ K be a Kripke model and let Ms ,M
′
s′
∈ AM be
action models. Then ((Ms ⊗Ms)⊗M
′
s′
)↔(Ms ⊗ (Ms ⊗M
′
s′
)).
These results are shown by Baltag, Moss and Solecki [8,7].
Definition 2.24 [n-bisimilarity of action models] Let n ∈ N, and let Ms =
((S,R, pre), s) ∈ AM and M′
s′
= ((S′,R′, pre′), s′) ∈ AM be action models. We
say that Ms is n-bisimilar to M
′
s′
, and write Ms↔nM
′
s′
, if and only if for every
a ∈ A the following conditions hold:
atoms ⊢ pre(s)↔ pre′(s′)
forth-n-a If n > 0 then for every t ∈ sRa there exists t
′ ∈ s′R′a such that
Mt↔(n−1)M
′
t′
French, Hales and Tay 7
back-n-a If n > 0 then for every t′ ∈ s′R′a there exists t ∈ sRa such that
Mt↔(n−1)M
′
t′
Proposition 2.25 The relation ↔n is an equivalence relation on action mod-
els.
Proposition 2.26 Let n ∈ N and let Ms ,M
′
s′
∈ K be action models such that
M
s
↔nM′s′ . If m < n then Ms↔mM
′
s′
.
Proposition 2.27 Let n ∈ N, let Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ K be Kripke models such that
Ms↔nM
′
s′ . and let Ms ,M
′
s′
∈ K be action models such that M
s
↔nM′s′ . Then
(Ms ⊗Ms)↔n(M
′
s′ ⊗M
′
s′
).
Proposition 2.28 Let Ms ,M
′
s′
∈ K be action models. Then Ms↔M
′
s′
if and
only if for every n ∈ N: Ms↔nM
′
s′
.
These results follow from similar reasoning to the results for n-bisimilarity
of Kripke models.
Definition 2.29 [B-bisimilarity of action models] Let M
s
= ((S,R, pre), s) ∈
K and M′
s′
= ((S′,R′, pre′), s′) ∈ K be Kripke models. We say that M
s
is
B-bisimilar to M′
s′
and write Ms↔BM
′
s′
, if and only if for every b ∈ B the
following conditions hold:
atoms For every p ∈ P : s ∈ V (p) if and only if s′ ∈ V ′(p).
forth-b For every t ∈ sRb there exists t
′ ∈ s′R′b such that Mt↔M
′
t′
.
back-b For every t′ ∈ s′R′b there exists t ∈ sRb such that Mt↔M
′
t′
.
Proposition 2.30 Let Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ K be Kripke models such that Ms↔BM
′
s′ .
and let Ms ,M
′
s′
∈ K be action models such that Ms↔BM
′
s′
. Then (Ms ⊗
M
s
)↔B(M ′s′ ⊗M
′
s′
).
This result follows from similar reasoning to the results for B-bisimilarity
of Kripke models.
Definition 2.31 [Axiomatisation AMLK] The axiomatisation AMLK is a
substitution schema consisting of the rules and axioms of K along with the
axioms:
AS ⊢ [M
T
⊗M′
T′
]ϕ↔ [M′
T′
][M
T
]ϕ
AU ⊢ [M
T
]ϕ↔
∧
t∈T [Mt ]ϕ
AP ⊢ [M
t
]p↔ (pre(t)→ p) for p ∈ P
AN ⊢ [Mt ]¬ϕ↔ (pre(t)→ ¬[Mt ]ϕ)
AC ⊢ [M
t
](ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ([M
t
]ϕ ∧ [M
t
]ψ)
AK ⊢ [M
t
]aϕ↔ (pre(t)→ a[MtRa ]ϕ)
and the rule:
NecA From ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ [M
T
]ϕ
Proposition 2.32 The axiomatisation AMLK is sound and complete for the
logic K⊗.
Proposition 2.33 The logic K⊗ is expressively equivalent to the logic K.
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These results are shown by Baltag, Moss and Solecki [8,7]. We note that
the completeness and expressive equivalence results follow from the fact that
AMLK forms a set of reduction axioms which give a provably correct transla-
tion from L⊗ to L .
We note that the same results hold for the logics K45⊗ and S5⊗ if we extend
AMLK with the additional axioms ofK45 and S5 and restrict the language to
only include AM K45 and AM S5 action models respectively, given the following
results.
Proposition 2.34 M ∈ K and M ∈ AM K45 if and only if M ⊗M ∈ K45 .
Proposition 2.35 M ∈ K and M ∈ AM S5 if and only if M ⊗M ∈ S5 .
Definition 2.36 [Simulation and refinement] LetM,M ′ ∈ K be Kripke mod-
els. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S′ is a simulation if and only if it satisfies
atoms, forth-a for every a ∈ A. If (s, s′) ∈ R then we call M ′s′ a simulation
of Ms and call Ms a refinement of M
′
s′ . We write M
′
s′
→Ms or equivalently
Ms←M
′
s′ .
Proposition 2.37 The relation ← is a preorder on Kripke models.
Proposition 2.38 Let Ms ∈ K and Ms ∈ AM . Then Ms ⊗Ms←Ms
These results are shown by van Ditmarsch and French [14].
Definition 2.39 [Semantics of arbitrary action model logic] Let C be a class
of Kripke models and let M ∈ C be a Kripke model. The interpretation of
ϕ ∈ L⊗∀ in the logic C⊗∀ is the same as its interpretation in the action model
logic C⊗ given in Definition 2.18 with the additional inductive case:
Ms  ∀ϕ iff for every M
′
s′ ∈ C such that M
′
s′
←Ms :M
′
s′  ϕ
The semantics of arbitrary action model logic are given by Hales [19], which
are a combination of the semantics of action model logic of Baltag, Moss and
Solecki [8,7] and the semantics of refinement modal logic of van Ditmarsch and
French [14].
As noted earlier, the action model logics K⊗, K45⊗ and S5⊗ are expressively
equivalent to their underlying modal logics via a provably correct translation.
Similarly it was shown by Bozzelli, et al. [10] and Hales, French and Davies [21]
that the refinement modal logics K∀, KD45∀ and S5 are expressively equiva-
lent to their underlying modal logics, also via a provably correct translation.
We note that the same result for K45∀ can be shown similarly to the result
for KD45∀. In axiomatising K⊗∀, Hales [19] simply noted that the rules and
axioms of AMLK and RMLK are sound in K⊗∀ and that the provably correct
translations for K⊗ and K∀ can be simply combined to form a provably correct
translation for K⊗∀. We reproduce the axiomatisation for K⊗∀ here, and note
that the same similar reasoning to [19] gives sound and complete axiomatisa-
tions and provably correct translations for K45⊗∀ and S5⊗∀, which we also list
here.
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Definition 2.40 [Disjunctive normal form] A formula in disjunctive normal
form is defined by the following abstract syntax:
ϕ :: pi ∧
∧
b∈B
∇aΓa | ϕ ∨ ϕ
where pi ∈ L0, B ⊆ A and for every b ∈ B, Γb is a finite set of formulae in
disjunctive normal form.
Proposition 2.41 Every formula of L is equivalent to a formula in disjunctive
normal form under the semantics of K.
This is shown by van Ditmarsch, French and Pinchinat [15].
Definition 2.42 [Axiomatisation AAMLK] The axiomatisation AAMLK is
a substitution schema consisting of the rules and axioms of AMLK along with
the axioms:
R ∀(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀ϕ→ ∀ψ)
RP ∀pi ↔ pi where pi ∈ L0
RK ∃∇aΓa ↔
∧
γ∈Γa ✸a
∃γ
RDist ∃
∧
a∈A∇aΓa ↔
∧
a∈A ∃∇aΓa
and the rule:
NecR From ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ ∀ϕ
The additional axioms forAAMLK are the additional axioms fromRMLK
for refinement modal logic, given by Bozzelli, et al. [10].
Proposition 2.43 The axiomatisation AAMLK is sound and complete for
the logic K⊗∀.
Proposition 2.44 The logic K⊗∀ is expressively equivalent to the logic K.
These results are shown by Hales [19].
Definition 2.45 [Alternating disjunctive normal form] A formula in a-
alternating disjunctive normal form is defined by the following abstract syntax:
ϕ :: pi ∧
∧
b∈B
∇bΓb | ϕ ∨ ϕ
where pi ∈ L0, B ⊆ A \ {a} and for every b ∈ B, Γb is a finite set of formulae
in b-alternating disjunctive normal form.
A formula in alternating disjunctive normal form is defined by the following
abstract syntax:
ϕ :: pi ∧
∧
b∈B
∇aΓa | ϕ ∨ ϕ
where pi ∈ L0, B ⊆ A and for every b ∈ B, Γb is a finite set of formulae in
b-alternating disjunctive normal form.
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The additional axioms for AAMLK45 are adapted from the additional
axioms from RMLKD45 for refinement doxastic logic, given by Hales, French
and Davies [21]. The axioms do not require that each Γa be non-empty, which
is due to the lack of seriality in the setting of K45 .
Proposition 2.46 Every formula of L is equivalent to a formula in alternating
disjunctive normal form under the semantics of K45.
This is shown by Hales, French and Davies [21] for KD45, however the same
reasoning applies to K45.
Definition 2.47 [Axiomatisation AAMLK45] The axiomatisation AMLK45
is a substitution schema consisting of the rules and axioms of AMLK45 along
with the rules and axioms R, RP and NecR of AAMLK and the axioms:
RK45 ∃∇aΓa ↔
∧
γ∈Γa ✸a
∃γ
RDist ∃
∧
a∈A∇aΓa ↔
∧
a∈A ∃∇aΓa
where for every a ∈ A, Γa is a finite set of a-alternating disjunctive normal
formulae.
The additional axioms for AAMLK45 are the additional axioms from
RMLK45 for refinement epistemic logic, given by Hales, French and
Davies [21].
The additional axioms for AAMLK45 are adapted from the additional
axioms from RMLKD45 for refinement modal logic, given by Hales, French
and Davies [21]. The axioms do not require that each Γa be non-empty, which
is due to the lack of seriality in the setting of K45 .
Proposition 2.48 The axiomatisation AAMLK45 is sound and complete for
the logic K45⊗∀.
Proposition 2.49 The logic K45⊗∀ is expressively equivalent to the logic K45.
These results follow from similar reasoning to the same results in K⊗∀.
Definition 2.50 [Explicit formulae] Let pi ∈ L0 be a propositional formula,
let γ0 ∈ L be a modal formula and for every a ∈ A let Γa ⊆ L be a finite set
of formulae such that γ0 ∈ Γa. Let Ψ = {ψ ≤ γ | a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γa} be the set of
subformulae of the formulae in each set Γa. Finally let ϕ be a formula of the
form
ϕ = pi ∧ γ0 ∧
∧
a∈A
∇aΓa
Then ϕ is an explicit formula if and only if the following conditions hold:
(i) For every a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γa, ψ ∈ Ψ: either ⊢S5 γ → ψ or ⊢S5 γ → ¬ψ.
(ii) For every a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γa, aψ ∈ Ψ: ⊢S5 γ → aψ if and only if for every
γ′ ∈ Γa: ⊢S5 γ
′ → ψ.
Proposition 2.51 Every formula of L is equivalent to a disjunction of explicit
formulae under the semantics of S5.
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This is shown by Hales, French and Davies [21].
Definition 2.52 [Axiomatisation AAMLS5] The axiomatisation AMLS5 is
a substitution schema consisting of the rules and axioms of AMLS5 along with
the rules and axioms R, RP and NecR of AAMLK and the axioms:
RS5 ∃(γ0 ∧ ∇aΓa)↔ ∃γ0 ∧
∧
γ∈Γa ✸a
∃γ
RDist ∃(γ0 ∧
∧
a∈A∇aΓa)↔
∧
a∈A ∃(γ
0 ∧ ∇aΓa)
where γ0 ∧
∧
a∈A ∃∇aΓa is an explicit formula and for every a ∈ A, γ
0 ∧∇aΓa
is an explicit formula.
Proposition 2.53 The axiomatisation AAMLS5 is sound and complete for
the logic S5⊗∀.
Proposition 2.54 The logic S5⊗∀ is expressively equivalent to the logic S5.
These results follow from similar reasoning to the same results in K⊗∀.
3 Syntax
Definition 3.1 [Language of arbitrary action formula logic] The language L?∀
of arbitrary action formula logic is inductively defined as:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | aϕ | [α]ϕ | ∀ϕ
where p ∈ P , a ∈ A and α ∈ L?∀act, and where the language L?∀act of arbitrary
action formulae is inductively as:
α ::=?ϕ | α ⊔ α | α⊗ α | LB(α, α)
where ϕ ∈ L?∀ and ∅ ⊂ B ⊆ A.
We use all of the standard abbreviations for arbitrary action model logic, in
addition to the abbreviations LBα ::= LB(α, α) and La(α, β) ::= L{a}(α, β).
We denote non-deterministic choice (⊔) over a finite set of action formula
∆ ⊆ L?∀act by
⊔
∆ and we denote sequential execution (⊗) of a finite, non-
empty sequence of action formulae (αi)
n
i=0 ∈ N
L?∀
act
by
⊗
(αi)
n
i=0 and define
them in the obvious way.
We refer to the languages L? of action formula logic and L?
act of action
formulae, which are L?∀ and L?∀
act respectively, both without the ∀ operator,
As in the action model logic [7], the intended meaning of the operator [α]ϕ
is that “ϕ is true in the result of any successful execution of the action α”.
In the following section we define the semantics of the action formula logic
in terms of action model execution. For each setting of K , K45 and S5 we
provide a function τC : L?
act → AM of translating action formulae from L?act
into action models. The result of executing an action α ∈ L?act is determined
by translating α into an action model τC (α) ∈ AM C , and then executing the
action model in the usual way.
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In each setting we have attempted to define the translation from action
formulae into action models in such a way that the action formulae carry an
intuitive description of the action that is performed by the corresponding action
model. We call the ? operator the test operator, and describe the action ?ϕ as
a test for ϕ. A test is intended to restrict the states in which an action can
successfully execute to states where the condition ϕ is true initially, but other-
wise leaves the state unchanged. We call the ⊔ operator the non-deterministic
choice operator, and describe the action α ⊔ β as a non-deterministic choice
between α and β. We call the ⊗ operator the sequential execution operator,
and describe the action α ⊗ β as an execution of α followed by β. Finally we
call LB the learning operator, and describe the action LB(α, β) as the agents
in B learning that the actions α or β occurred. This action is intended to
result in the agents B knowing or believing what would be true if α or β were
executed. For example, if a consequence of executing α is that ϕ is true in the
result, then the intention is that a consequence of executing La(α, α) is that
aϕ is true in the result. As we will see, this property is generally true in K?,
however due to the extra frame conditions of K45 and S5 it is only true for
some formulae ϕ in K45? and S5?.
Example 3.2 If p stands for the proposition “the grant application was suc-
cessful” then the action described in Example 1.1 might be written in the form
of an action formula as:
α =LEd(?p)⊗
LJames(LEd?p ⊔ LEd?¬p ⊔ LTim?p ⊔ LTim?¬p)⊗
LTim((?¬p⊗ LJames?¬p)⊔?⊤)
4 Semantics
We now define the semantics of arbitrary action formula logic. As mentioned
earlier, the semantics are defined by translating action formulae into action
models. The translation used varies in each class of K , K45 and S5 that
we work in, according to the frame conditions in each class. Therefore our
semantics are parameterised by a function τC : L?
act → AM that will vary
according to the class of Kripke models.
Definition 4.1 [Semantics of arbitrary action formula logic] Let C be a class
of Kripke models, let τC : L?
act → AM be a function from action formulae to
multi-pointed action models, and let M = (S,R, V ) ∈ C be a Kripke model.
Then the interpretation of ϕ ∈ L?∀ in the logic C?∀ is the same as its inter-
pretation in modal logic given in Definition 2.5, with the additional inductive
cases:
Ms  [α]ϕ iff Ms ⊗ τC (α) ∈ C implies Ms ⊗ τC (α)  ϕ
Ms  ∀ϕ iff for every M
′
s′ ∈ C such that M
′
s′
←Ms :M
′
s′  ϕ
where action model execution ⊗ is as defined in Definition 2.18 and the refine-
ment relation is defined in Definition 2.36
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We note that the semantics of arbitrary action formula logic C?∀ are very
similar to the semantics of arbitrary action model logic C⊗∀ [19]. We generalise
the semantics to the classes of K , K45 and S5 by introducing the parameterised
class C and restricting successful updates to those that result in C models as
in the approach of Balbiani, et al [5]. The difference is that as actions are
specified in L?∀ formulae as action formulae, then the semantics must first
translate the action formulae into action models before performing action model
execution. As such there is a semantically correct translation from L?∀ formulae
to L⊗∀ formulae (by replacing occurrences of α with τC (α)), and any validities,
axioms or results from arbitrary action model logic also apply in this setting
if the language is restricted to action models that are defineable by action
formulae. Therefore for the current section and the following sections concering
the axiomatisations (Section 5) and correspondence results (Section 6), we will
deal only with the action formula logic, rather than the full arbitrary action
formula logic, focussing on the differences and correspondences between action
formulae and action models, rather than getting distracted by the refinement
quantifiers which behave identically between each logic. We return to the full
arbitrary action formula logic in Section 7 for the synthesis results.
We give the following general result.
Proposition 4.2 Let C be a class of Kripke models. For every ϕ ∈ L?∀ there
exists ϕ′ ∈ L⊗∀ such that for every MT ∈ C : MT C?∀ ϕ if and only if
MT C⊗∀ ϕ
′.
In the following subsections we will give definitions for τK , τK45 and τS5 .
These functions vary according to the class of Kripke models being used. When
the class is clear from context, then we will simply write τ instead of τC .
We begin by giving a definition of τ for translating actions involving non-
deterministic choice and sequential execution. These definitions are common
to all of the settings we are working in.
Definition 4.3 [Non-deterministic choice] Let C ∈ {K ,K45 , S5 } and let
α, β ∈ L?act where τC (α) = MαTα = ((S
α,Rα, preα),Tα) and τC (β) = M
β
Tβ
=
((Sβ ,Rβ , preβ),Tβ) such that Sα and Sβ are disjoint. We define τC (α ⊔ β) =
M
T
= ((S,R, pre),T) where:
S = Sα ∪ Sβ
Ra = R
α
a ∪ R
β
a for a ∈ A
pre = preα ∪ preβ
T =Tα ∪ Tβ
Definition 4.4 [Sequential execution] Let C ∈ {K ,K45 , S5 }, and let α, β ∈
L?
act where τC (α) = M
α
Tα
= ((Sα,Rα, preα),Tα) and τC (β) = M
β
Tβ
=
((Sβ ,Rβ , preβ),Tβ). We define τC (α⊗ β) = MαTα ⊗M
β
Tβ
.
We give some properties of non-deterministic choice and sequential execu-
tion of action formulae.
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Proposition 4.5 Let α, β, γ ∈ L?act and ϕ ∈ L?. Then the following are valid
in K?, K45? and S5?:
 [α ⊔ β]ϕ↔ ([α]ϕ ∧ [β]ϕ)
 [α⊗ β]ϕ↔ [α][β]ϕ
 [α ⊔ α]ϕ↔ [α]ϕ
 [α ⊔ β]ϕ↔ [β ⊔ α]ϕ
 [(α ⊔ β) ⊔ γ]ϕ↔ [α ⊔ (β ⊔ γ)]ϕ
 [(α⊗ β)⊗ γ]ϕ↔ [α⊗ (β ⊗ γ)]ϕ
 [(α ⊔ β)⊗ γ]ϕ↔ [(α⊗ γ) ⊔ (β ⊗ γ)]ϕ
These validities follow trivially from the semantics of C?∀ and Definitions 4.3
and 4.4.
In the following subsections we give definitions of τC for translating action
formulae involving tests and learning in the settings of K , K45 and S5 . We
note that in each subsection the constructions of action models used to define
tests and learning closely resemble the constructions of refinements used to
show the soundness of axioms in refinement modal logic [10,21].
4.1 K
Definition 4.6 [Test] Let ϕ ∈ L?. We define τ(?ϕ) = MT = ((S,R, pre),T)
where:
S = {test, skip}
Ra = {(test, skip), (skip, skip)} for a ∈ A
pre = {(test, ϕ), (skip,⊤)}
T = {test}
Definition 4.7 [Learning] Let α ∈ L?act where τ(α) = MαTα =
((Sα,Rα, preα),Tα). Let test and skip be new states not appearing in Sα. We
define τ(LB(α, α)) = MT = ((S,R, pre),T) where:
S = Sα ∪ {test, skip}
Ra = R
α
a ∪ {(skip, skip)} ∪ {(test, t
α) | tα ∈ Tα} for a ∈ B
Ra = R
α
a ∪ {(test, skip), (skip, skip)} for a /∈ B
pre = preα ∪ {(test,⊤), (skip,⊤)}
T = {test}
We define τ(LB(α, β)) = τ(LB(α ⊔ β, α ⊔ β)).
We note that the syntax of action formula logic defines the learning operator
as a binary operator that can be applied to two different action formulae,
however in the setting of K and K45 we only give a direct definition of τ for
actions of the form LB(α, α) and define the more general case in terms of this.
Intuitively LB(α, β) is intended to represent an action where the agents in B
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learn that α or β have occurred (i.e. that α ⊔ β has occurred). The setting of
S5 corresponds to a notion of knowledge, where anything that an agent knows
must be true, and therefore anything that an agent learns must also be true. So
in an action where agents learn that α or β have occurred, one of those actions
must have actually occurred. Therefore in S5 we describe the action LB(α, β)
as the agents in B learning that α or β have occurred, when in reality α has
actually occurred. On the other hand, the settings of K and K45 correspond
more closely to a notion of belief, where there is no requirement that what
an agent believes is true. So in an action where agents learn that α or β have
occurred, neither of these actions must actually have occurred. Therefore in the
settings of K and K45 we make no distinction between α and β in a description
of the action LB(α, β), hence the definition of τ given in these settings.
4.2 K45
Definition 4.8 [Test] Let ϕ ∈ L?. We define τ(?ϕ) as in Definition 4.6 for K .
Definition 4.9 [Learning] Let α ∈ L?act where τ(α) = MαTα =
((Sα,Rα, preα),Tα). Let test and skip be new states not appearing in Sα. For
every tα ∈ Tα let t¯α be a new state not appearing in Sα. We call each t¯α a
proxy state for tα. We define τ(LB(α, α)) = MT = ((S,R, pre),T) where:
S = Sα ∪ {test, skip} ∪ {t¯α | tα ∈ Tα}
Ra = R
α
a ∪ {(skip, skip)} ∪ {(test, t¯
α) | tα ∈ Tα} ∪
{(¯tα, u¯α) | tα, uα ∈ Tα} for a ∈ B
Ra = R
α
a ∪ {(test, skip), (skip, skip)} ∪
{(¯tα, uα) | tα ∈ Tα, uα ∈ tαRαa} for a /∈ B
pre = preα ∪ {(test,⊤), (skip,⊤)} ∪ {(¯tα, preα(tα)) | tα ∈ Tα}
T = {test}
As in Definition 4.7, we define τ(LB(α, β)) = τ(LB(α ⊔ β, α ⊔ β)).
Lemma 4.10 Let α ∈ L?act. Then τ(α) ∈ AM K45 .
Lemma 4.11 Let α ∈ L?act and let MT ∈ K45 . Then MT ⊗ τ(α) ∈ K45 .
We note that the definition for τ given here varies considerably from the
definition given in the setting of K due to the presence of the proxy states.
The proxy states are introduced due to the additional frame constraints in
K45 and the desire that the action models constructed by τ be AM K45 action
models. In constructing τ(LBα) we wish to construct an action model with a
root state whose B-successors are the root states of τ(α), so that the result of
executing the action LBα is that the agents B believe that the action α has
occurred. However in order for this construction to result in a AM K45 action
model, we must take the transitive, Euclidean closure of the B-successors of
the root state. If we were to perform a construction similar to that used in
the setting of K where proxy states are not used, then this would mean that
the for every b ∈ B, the b-successors of the root state would include all of the
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b-successors of the root states, and not just the root states themselves. To show
why this is not desireable, consider the simple example of the action La?ϕ. The
intention is that this action represents a private announcement to a that ϕ is
true, as it is in the setting of K . Without using proxy states, if we wanted
to include the state test in the a-successors of the root state of τ(α) then in
order to construct a AM K45 action model we would need to take the transitive,
Euclidean closure of the a-successors of test. As skip is an a-successor of test
in the action ?ϕ, then this would mean that a would not be able to distinguish
between the actions states test and skip and so the result of executing τ(α)
would be that a learns nothing. With the construction provided, the action
La?ϕ gives the desired result that a learns that ϕ is true.
We also note that the results presented in this paper for K45 can
be extended to KD45 by modifying Definition 4.9 so that pre(test) =∧
a∈B
∨
tα∈Tα ✸apre
α(tα), which guarantees that the result of successfully exe-
cuting an action formula has the seriality property of KD45 .
4.3 S5
Definition 4.12 [Test] Let ϕ ∈ L?. We define τ(?ϕ) = MT = ((S,R, pre),T)
where:
S = {test, skip}
Ra = S
2 for a ∈ A
pre = {(test, ϕ), (skip,⊤)}
T = {test}
Definition 4.13 [Learning] Let α, β ∈ L?act where τ(α) = MαTα =
((Sα,Rα, preα),Tα) and τ(β) = Mβ
Tβ
= ((Sβ ,Rβ, preβ),Tβ). For every
t ∈ Tα ∪ Tβ let t¯ be a new state not appearing in Sα ∪ Sβ . We define
τ(LB(α, β)) = MT = ((S,R, pre),T) where:
S = Sα ∪ Sβ ∪ {t¯ | t ∈ Tα ∪ Tβ}
Ra = R
α
a ∪ R
β
a ∪ {(¯t, u¯) | t, u ∈ T
α ∪ Tβ} for a ∈ B
Ra = R
α
a ∪ R
β
a ∪
⋃
t∈Tα∪Tβ
({t¯} ∪ t(Rαa ∪ R
β
a))
2 for a /∈ B
pre = preα ∪ preβ ∪ {(¯t, (preα ∪ preβ)(t)) | t ∈ Tα ∪ Tβ}
T = {t¯ | t ∈ Tα}
Lemma 4.14 Let α ∈ L?act. Then τ(α) ∈ AM S5 .
Lemma 4.15 Let α ∈ L?act and let MT ∈ S5 . Then MT ⊗ τ(α) ∈ S5 .
We note that as in the setting of K45 the definition of τ uses proxy states
to construct action models from learning operators. However unlike in the
settings of K and K45 this construction does not introduce the new states test
and skip. As discussed earlier this is because in the setting of S5 , in an action
where agents learn that α or β have occurred, one of those actions must have
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actually occurred. Unlike in the settings of K and K45 we have distinguished
between the actions α and β, designating that α is the action that has actually
occurred. We also note that the definition of τ for test operators is different
from that used in K and K45 , simply to account for the additional frame
constraints of S5 .
5 Axiomatisation
In the following subsections we give sound and complete axiomatisations for
the action formulae logic in the settings of K and K45 . In the setting of
S5 we provide a sound but not complete axiomatisation, and comment on the
difficulty of giving a complete axiomatisation and the possible alternatives. We
note that axiomatisations for arbitrary action formula logic in these settings
can be derived trivially from these axiomatisations by adding the additional
axioms and rules from refinement modal logic.
5.1 K
Definition 5.1 [Axiomatisation AFLK] The axiomatisation AFLK is a sub-
stitution schema consisting of the rules and axioms ofK along with the axioms:
LT ⊢ [?ϕ]ψ ↔ (ϕ→ ψ) for ψ ∈ L
LU ⊢ [α ⊔ β]ϕ↔ ([α]ϕ ∧ [β]ϕ)
LS ⊢ [α⊗ β]ϕ↔ [α][β]ϕ
LP ⊢ [LB(α, β)]p↔ p
LN ⊢ [LB(α, β)]¬ϕ↔ ¬[LB(α, β)]ϕ
LC ⊢ [LB(α, β)](ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ([LB(α, β)]ϕ ∧ [LB(α, β)]ψ)
LK1 ⊢ [LB(α, β)]aϕ↔ a[α ⊔ β]ϕ for a ∈ B
LK2 ⊢ [LB(α, β)]aϕ↔ aϕ for a /∈ B
and the rule:
NecL From ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ [α]ϕ
Proposition 5.2 The axiomatisation AFLK is sound in the logic K⊗.
Proof. LT follows from applying the reduction axioms of AMLK inductively
to [?ϕ]ψ.
LU and LS follow from Proposition 4.5.
Let τ(Lb(α, β)) = Ms = ((S,R, pre), s). LP, LN and LC follow trivially
from the AMLK axioms AP, AN and AC respectively, noting from Defini-
tion 4.7 that pre(s) = ⊤. LK1 follows trivially from the AMLK axiom AK,
noting from Definition 4.7 that as a ∈ A then M
sRa
↔τ(α ⊔ β). NecL follows
trivially from the AMLK rule NecA. LK2 follows trivially from the AMLK
axiom AK, noting from Definition 4.7 that as a /∈ A then M
sRa
↔τ(?⊤). ✷
Proposition 5.3 The axiomatisation AFLK is complete for the logic K⊗.
We note that the axiomatisation AFLK forms a set of reduction axioms
that gives a provably correct translation from L? to L .
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Example 5.4 We give an example derivation that the action formula α given
in Example 3.2 does indeed satisfy (part of) the epistemic goal stated in Ex-
ample 1.1.
⊢ [?p]p↔ (p→ p) (1)
⊢ [?p]p (2)
⊢Ed[?p]p (3)
⊢ [LEd?p]Edp (4)
(1) follows from LT, (3) follows from NecK and (4) follows from LK1.
Similarly we have
⊢ [LEd?¬p]Ed¬p
⊢ [LTim?p]Timp
⊢ [LTim?¬p]Tim¬p
Let ϕ = Edp ∨Ed¬p ∨Timp ∨Tim¬p. Then:
⊢ [LEd?p ⊔ LEd?¬p ⊔ LTim?p ⊔ LTim?¬p]ϕ (5)
⊢James[LEd?p ⊔ LEd?¬p ⊔ LTim?p ⊔ LTim?¬p]ϕ (6)
⊢ [LJames(LEd?p ⊔ LEd?¬p ⊔ LTim?p ⊔ LTim?¬p)]Jamesϕ (7)
⊢ [α]Jamesϕ (8)
(5) follows from LU, (6) follows from NecK and (7) follows from LK1. (8)
follows from LS and LK2.
Therefore a consequence of successfully executing α is that James learns
that Ed or Tim knows whether the grant application was successful.
5.2 K45
Definition 5.5 [Axiomatisation AFLK45] The axiomatisation AFLK45 is a
substitution schema consisting of the rules and axioms of K45 along with the
rules and axioms of AFLK, but substituting the AFLK axiom LK1 for the
axiom:
LK1 ⊢ [LB(α, β)]aχ↔ a[α ⊔ β]χ for a ∈ B
and the rule:
NecL From ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ [α]ϕ
where χ is a (A \ {a})-restricted formula.
Proposition 5.6 The axiomatisation AFLK45 is sound in the logic K45⊗.
Proof. Soundness of LT, LU, LS, LP, LN, LC, LK2 and NecL follow from
the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 5.2.
LK1 follows from the AMLK45 axiom AK. We note that as a ∈ B, from
Definition 4.9 we have M
sRa
↔(A\{a})τ(α ⊔ β), and as χ is (A \ {a})-restricted
formula then  [M
sRa
]χ↔ [τ(α ⊔ β)]χ. ✷
Proposition 5.7 The axiomatisation AFLK45 is complete for the logic K45⊗.
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We note that the axiomatisation AFLK45 forms a set of reduction axioms
that gives a provably correct translation from L? to L . To translate a subfor-
mula [α]ϕ, where ϕ ∈ L , we must first translate ϕ to the alternating disjunctive
normal form of [21], which gives the property that for every subformula aψ,
the formula ψ is (A \ {a})-restricted, and therefore LK1 is applicable.
5.3 S5
Definition 5.8 [AxiomatisationAFLS5] The axiomatisationAFLS5 is a sub-
stitution schema consisting of the rules and axioms of S5 along with the axioms:
LT ⊢ [?ϕ]ψ ↔ (ϕ→ ψ) for ψ ∈ L
LU ⊢ [α ⊔ β]ϕ↔ ([α]ϕ ∧ [β]ϕ)
LS ⊢ [α⊗ β]ϕ↔ [α][β]ϕ
LP ⊢ [LB(α, β)]p↔ p
LN ⊢ [LB(α, β)]¬ϕ↔ ¬[LB(α, β)]ϕ
LC ⊢ [LB(α, β)](ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ([LB(α, β)]ϕ ∧ [LB(α, β)]ψ)
and the rule:
NecL From ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ [α]ϕ
where χ is a (A \ {a})-restricted formula.
Proposition 5.9 The axiomatisation AFLS5 is sound in the logic S5⊗.
Proof. Soundness of LT, LU, LS, LP, LN, LC and NecL follow from the
same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 5.2. ✷
We note that we do not have a axioms in S5? corresponding to the axioms
LK1 and LK2 from AFLK and AFLK45. LK1 works in the setting of K
because the B-successors of the root state of τ(LBα) are bisimilar to the root
states of τ(α), and so the consequences of executing τ(α) are the same as
the consequences of executing the B-successors of τ(LBα). In the setting of
K45 this is not the case, however we do have the restricted property of B-
bisimilarity, giving us that the B-restricted consequences are the same. In the
setting of S5 we do not know of such a property to relate the consequences of
the B-successors of τ(LB(α, β)) to the consequences of τ(α ⊔ β). Given the
correspondence results of the previous section, it should be possible to construct
an action formula that is n-bisimilar to the B-successors of τ(LB(α, β)), where
d(ϕ) = n, and define axioms for LK1 and LK2 in terms of this action formula
and not α ⊔ β. However translating L? formulae into L⊗ formulae and then
using the axiomatisation AMLS5 would certainly be simpler.
6 Correspondence
In the following subsections we show the correspondence between action for-
mulae and action models in the settings of K , K45 and S5 . In each setting we
show that action formulae are capable of representing any action model up to
n-bisimilarity.
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6.1 K
To begin we give two lemmas to simplify the construction that we will use for
our correspondence result in K .
Lemma 6.1 Let ϕ ∈ L? and Ms = ((S,R, pre), s) ∈ AM . Then let M
′
s′
=
((S′,R′, pre′), s′) ∈ AM where:
S′ = S ∪ {s′}
R′a = Ra ∪ {(s
′, t) | t ∈ sRa} for a ∈ A
pre′ = pre ∪ {(s′, ϕ ∧ pre(s))}
Then τ(?ϕ) ⊗Ms↔M
′
s′
.
Lemma 6.2 Let α ∈ L?act where τ(α) = MαTα = ((S
α,Rα, preα),Tα), a ∈ A
and M
s
= ((S,R, pre), s) ∈ AM such that sRa = {t} for some t ∈ S and
tRa = {t} Then let M
′
s′
= ((S′,R′, pre′), s′) ∈ AM where:
S′ = S ∪ Sα ∪ {s′}
R′a = Ra ∪ R
α
a ∪ {(s
′, tα) | tα ∈ Tα}
R′b = Rb ∪ R
α
b ∪ {(s
′, t) | t ∈ sRb} for b ∈ A \ {a}
pre′ = pre ∪ {(s′, pre(s))}
Then τ(Laα)⊗Ms↔M
′
s′
.
Proposition 6.3 Let Ms ∈ AM and let n ∈ N. Then there exists α ∈ L?
act
such that M
s
↔nτ(α).
Proof. By induction on n.
Suppose that n = 0. Let α =?pre(s) and τ(α) = M′
s′
= ((S′,R′, pre′), s′).
From Definition 4.6 we have that pre(s) = pre′(s′), so (Ms ,M
′
s′
) satisfies atoms
and therefore Ms↔0M
′
s′
.
Suppose that n > 0. By the induction hypothesis, for every a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa
there exists αa,t ∈ L?act such that Mt↔(n−1)τ(α
a,t), where τ(αa,t )↔Ma,t
sa,t
=
((Sa,t ,Ra,t , prea,t), sa,t).
Let α =?pre(s) ⊗
⊗
a∈A La(
⊔
t∈sRa
αt). Then from Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2:
τ(α)↔M′
s′
= ((S′,R′, pre′), s′) where:
S′ =
⋃
a∈A,t∈sRa
(Sa,t) ∪ {s′}
R′a =
⋃
b∈A,t∈sR
b
(Rb,ta ) ∪ {(s
′, sa,t) | t ∈ sRa} for a ∈ A
pre′ =
⋃
a∈A,t∈sRa
(prea,t) ∪ {(s′, pre(s))}
We note for every a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa that M
′
sa,t
↔Ma,t
sa,t
as for every a ∈ A,
u ∈ Sa,t we have uR′a = uR
a,t
a .
We show that (M
s
,M′
s′
) satisfies atoms, forth-n-a and back-n-a for every
a ∈ A.
French, Hales and Tay 21
atoms By construction pre′(s′) = pre(s).
forth-n-a Let t ∈ sRa. By construction s
a,t ∈ s′R′a, by the induction hypoth-
esis Mt↔(n−1)M
a,t
sa,t
and from above Ma,t
sa,t
↔M′
sa,t
. Therefore by transitivity
M
t
↔(n−1)M
′
sa,t
.
back-n-a Follows from similar reasoning to forth-n-a.
Therefore M
s
↔nτ(α). ✷
Corollary 6.4 Let Ms ∈ AM . Then for every ϕ ∈ L⊗ there exists α ∈ L?
act
such that K⊗ [Ms ]ϕ↔ [τ(α)]ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that d(ϕ) = n. From Proposition 6.3 there exists α ∈ L?act
such that Ms↔nτ(α). Therefore for every Ms ∈ K we have Ms ⊗Ms↔nMs ⊗
τ(α) and so M
s
⊗ M
s
K⊗ ϕ if and only if Ms ⊗ τ(α) K⊗ ϕ. Therefore
M
s
K⊗ [Ms ]ϕ if and only if Ms K⊗ [τ(α)]ϕ. ✷
Corollary 6.5 Let ϕ ∈ L⊗. Then there exists ϕ′ ∈ L? such that for every
Ms ∈ K : Ms K⊗ ϕ if and only if Ms K? ϕ
′.
Proof. [Sketch] Given Corollary 6.4 we can replace all occurrences of [M
s
]ψ
within ϕ with an equivalent [α]ψ where α ∈ L?act. ✷
6.2 K45
As in the previous subsection we give a lemma to simplify the construction
that we will use, although as the definition of τ(?ϕ) is the same between K
and K45 we simply reuse Lemma 6.1 from the previous subsection.
Lemma 6.6 Let a ∈ A, α ∈ L?act where τ(α) = MαTα = ((S
α,Rα, preα),Tα),
and Ms = ((S,R, pre), s) ∈ AM such that sRa = {t} for some t ∈ S and
tRa = {t} Then let M
′
s′
= ((S′,R′, pre′), s′) ∈ AM where:
S′ = S ∪ Sα ∪ {t¯α | tα ∈ Tα} ∪ {s′}
R′a = Ra ∪ R
α
a ∪ {(s
′, t¯α) | tα ∈ Tα} ∪ {(¯tα, u¯α) | tα, uα ∈ Tα}
R′b = Rb ∪ R
α
b ∪ {(s
′, t) | t ∈ sRb} for b ∈ A \ {a}
pre′ = pre ∪ {(¯tα, preα(tα)) | tα ∈ Tα} ∪ {(s′, pre(s))}
Then τ(Laα)⊗Ms↔M
′
s′
.
Proposition 6.7 Let M
s
∈ AM K45 and let n ∈ N. Then there exists α ∈ L?
act
such that M
s
↔nτ(α).
Proof. By induction on n.
Suppose that n = 0. Let α =?pre(s) and τ(α) = M′
s′
= ((S′,R′, pre′), s′).
From Definition 4.8 we have that pre(s) = pre′(s′), so (M
s
,M′
s′
) satisfies atoms
and therefore Ms↔0M
′
s′
.
Suppose that n > 0. By the induction hypothesis, for every a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa
there exists αa,t ∈ L?act such that Mt↔(n−1)τ(α
a,t ). For every a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa
let τ(αa,t ) = Ma,t
sa,t
= ((Sa,t ,Ra,t , prea,t), sa,t).
Let α =?pre(s) ⊗
⊗
a∈A La(
⊔
t∈sRa
αa,t). Then from Lemmas 6.1 and 6.6:
τ(α)↔M′
s′
= ((S′,R′, pre′), s′) where:
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S′ =
⋃
a∈A,t∈sRa
(Sa,t) ∪ {s¯a,t | a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa} ∪ {s
′}
R′a =
⋃
b∈A,t∈sR
b
(Rb,ta ) ∪ {(s
′, s¯a,t) | t ∈ sRa} ∪ {(¯s
a,t , s¯a,u) | t, u ∈ sRa} ∪
{(¯sb,t , u) | b ∈ A \ {a}, t ∈ sRb, u ∈ s
b,tRb,ta } for a ∈ A
pre′ =
⋃
a∈A,t∈sRa
(prea,t) ∪ {(¯sa,t , prea,t(sa,t)) | a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa} ∪ {(s
′, pre(s))}
As in the proof of Proposition 6.3, we note for every a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa that
M′
sa,t
↔Ma,t
sa,t
.
We need to show that (Ms ,M
′
s′
) satisfies atoms, forth-n-a and back-n-a
for every a ∈ A. We use reasoning similar to the proof of Proposition 6.3,
however noting that the successors of s′ in M′ are not the same as in the
construction used previously. We claim that each s¯a,t state is (n− 1)-bisimilar
to the corresponding sa,t state. We show this by showing for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n−1,
a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa that M
′
s¯a,t
↔iM′sa,t . We proceed by induction on i.
atoms By construction pre′(¯sa,t) = pre′(sa,t).
forth-i-b Suppose that 0 < i ≤ n− 1. Let u ∈ s¯a,tR′b.
Suppose that b = a. By construction there exists v ∈ sRa such that u = s¯
a,v .
From above M′
sa,t
↔Ma,t
sa,t
and M′
sa,v
↔Ma,vsa,v . By the outer induction hypothe-
sis Ma,t
sa,t
↔(n−1)Mt and M
a,v
sa,v
↔(n−1)Mv . By transitivity M
′
sa,t
↔(n−1)Mt and
M′
sa,v
↔(n−1)Mv . As v ∈ tRa from back-(n − 1)-a there exists w ∈ s
a,tR′a
such that M′
w
↔(n−2)Mv . By transitivity M
′
w
↔(n−2)M
′
sa,v
. By the induction
hypothesis M′s¯a,v↔(i−1)M
′
sa,v . Therefore by transitivity M
′
s¯a,v
↔(i−1)M
′
w .
Suppose that b 6= a. By construction s¯a,tR′b = s
a,tR′b, so u ∈ s
a,tR′b and we
trivially have that M′u↔M
′
u .
back-i-b Follows similar reasoning to forth-i-b.
Therefore for every a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa we have that M
′
s¯a,t
↔(n−1)M
′
sa,t
.
We can now show that Ms↔nM
′
s′
by using the same reasoning as the proof
for Proposition 6.3, using the (n − 1)-bisimilar M′
s¯a,t
states in place of corre-
sponding M′
sa,t
states.
Therefore Ms↔nτ(α). ✷
Corollary 6.8 Let Ms ∈ AM K45 . Then for every ϕ ∈ L⊗ there exists α ∈
L?
act such that K45⊗ [Ms ]ϕ↔ [τ(α)]ϕ.
Corollary 6.9 Let ϕ ∈ L⊗. Then there exists ϕ′ ∈ L? such that for every
Ms ∈ K45 : Ms K45⊗ ϕ if and only if Ms K45? ϕ
′.
6.3 S5
Once more we give two lemmas to simplify the construction that we will use.
Lemma 6.10 Let ϕ ∈ L? and Ms = ((S,R, pre), s) ∈ AM . Then let M
′
s
=
((S′,R′, pre′), s) ∈ AM where:
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S′ = S
R′a = Ra for a ∈ A
pre′ = pre \ {(s, pre(s))} ∪ {(s, ϕ ∧ pre(s))}
Then τ(?ϕ) ⊗Ms↔M
′
s′
.
Lemma 6.11 Let a ∈ A, α ∈ L?act where τ(α) = MαTα = ((S
α,Rα, preα),Tα),
and Ms = ((S,R, pre), s) ∈ AM such that sRa = {s} and pre(s) = ⊤. Then let
M′
s
= ((S′,R′, pre′), s) ∈ AM where:
S′ = S ∪ Sα ∪ {t¯α | tα ∈ Tα}
R′a = Ra ∪ R
α
a ∪ ({s} ∪ {t¯
α | tα ∈ Tα})2
R′b = Rb ∪ R
α
b ∪ ({t¯
α} ∪ tαRαb )
2 for b ∈ A \ {a}
pre′ = pre ∪ {(¯tα, preα(tα)) | tα ∈ Tα}
Then τ(La(?⊤, α))⊗Ms↔M
′
s′
.
Proposition 6.12 Let M
s
∈ AM S5 and let n ∈ N. Then there exists α ∈ L?
act
such that Ms↔nτ(α).
Proof. By induction on n.
Suppose that n = 0. Let α =?pre(s) and τ(α) = M′
s′
= ((S′,R′, pre′), s′).
From Definition 4.12 we have that pre(s) = pre′(s′), so (M
s
,M′
s′
) satisfies atoms
and therefore Ms↔0M
′
s′
.
Suppose that n > 0. By the induction hypothesis, for every a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa
there exists αa,t ∈ L?act such that Mt↔(n−1)τ(α
a,t ). For every a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa
let τ(αa,t ) = Ma,t
sa,t
= ((Sa,t ,Ra,t , prea,t), sa,t).
Let α =?pre(s) ⊗
⊗
a∈A La(?⊤,
⊔
t∈sRa
αa,t). Then from Lemmas 6.1
and 6.6: τ(α) = M′
s′
= ((S′,R′, pre′), s′) where:
S′ =
⋃
a∈A,t∈sRa
(Sa,t) ∪ {s¯a,t | a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa} ∪ {s
′}
R′a =
⋃
b∈A,t∈sR
b
(Rb,ta ) ∪ ({s
′} ∪ {s¯a,t | t ∈ sRa})
2 ∪
⋃
b∈A\{a},t∈R
b
({s¯b,t} ∪ sb,tRb,ta )
2 for a ∈ A
pre′ =
⋃
a∈A,t∈sRa
(prea,t) ∪ {(¯sa,t , prea,t(sa,t)) | a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa} ∪ {(s
′, pre(s))}
We note that unlike the constructions used for Proposition 6.3 and Propo-
sition 6.7, this construction does not have M′u↔M
a,t
u , as we do not have that
sa,tR′a = s
a,tRa,ta . Similar to the proof of Proposition 6.7 we claim that each
s¯a,t state is (n− 1)-bisimilar to the corresponding st state. However in lieu of
bisimilarity of Sa,t states we need another result for these states. We also need
to consider the additional state s′, which due to reflexivity is also a successor
of itself.
We need to show for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1:
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(i) For every a ∈ A: M′
s′
↔iM′s¯a,s .
(ii) For every a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa: M
′
s¯a,t
↔iM′sa,t .
(iii) For every a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa, u ∈ S
a,t , v ∈ S: if Ma,t
u
↔iMv then M
′
u
↔iMv .
We proceed by induction on i.
(i) For every a ∈ A: M′
s′
↔iM′s¯a,s .
atoms By the outer induction hypothesis Ma,ssa,s↔(n−1)Ms and so ⊢
prea,s(sa,s) ↔ pre(s). By construction pre′(s′) = pre(s) and pre′(¯sa,s) =
prea,s(sa,s) and therefore ⊢ pre′(s′)↔ prea,s (¯sa,s).
forth-i-b Suppose that 0 < i ≤ n− 1. Let u ∈ s′R′a.
Suppose that b = a. By construction s′R′a = s¯
a,sR′a and we trivially have
that M′u↔M
′
u .
Suppose that b 6= a. By construction s′R′b = {s¯
b,t | t ∈ sRb} ∪ {s
′}
and s¯a,sR′b = s
a,sR
a,s
b ∪ {s¯
a,s}. Suppose that u = s′. Then by the in-
duction hypothesis M′
s′
↔(i−1)M
′
s¯a,s . Suppose that u ∈ {s¯
b,t | t ∈ sRb}.
Then there exists t ∈ sRb such that u = s¯
b,t . By the outer induction
hypothesis Ma,ssa,s↔(n−1)Ms . As t ∈ sRb then by back-(n − 1)-b there ex-
ists v ∈ sa,sRa,sb ⊆ s¯
a,sR′b such that M
a,s
v
↔(n−2)Mt . Then by the inner
induction hypothesis this implies M′v↔(i−1)Mt . By the inner induction
hypothesis M′
s¯b,t
↔(i−1)M
′
sb,t
↔(i−1)M
b,t
sb,t
and by the outer induction hy-
pothesis Mb,t
sb,t
↔(n−1)Mt so by transitivity M
′
s¯b,t
↔(i−1)Mt . Therefore by
transitivity we have that M′
s¯b,t
↔(i−1)M
′
v
.
back-i-b Follows similar reasoning to forth-i-b.
(ii) For every a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa: M
′
s¯a,t
↔iM′sa,t .
atoms By construction pre′ (¯sa,t) = pre′(sa,t).
forth-i-b Suppose that 0 < i ≤ n− 1. Let u ∈ s¯a,tR′a.
Suppose that b = a. By construction s¯a,tR′a = {s¯
a,v | v ∈ tRa} ∪ {s
′}.
Suppose that u ∈ {s¯a,v | v ∈ tRa}. Then there exists v ∈ tRa such
that u = s¯a,v . By the outer induction hypothesis Ma,t
sa,t
↔(n−1)Mt . As
v ∈ tRa then by back-(n − 1)-a there exists w ∈ s
a,tRa,ta ⊆ s
a,tR′a
such that Ma,t
w
↔(n−2)Mv . Then by the inner induction hypothesis this
implies M′
w
↔(i−1)Mv . By the inner and outer induction hypothesis
M′s¯a,v↔(i−1)Mv . Therefore by transitivity we have that M
′
s¯a,v
↔(i−1)M
′
w .
Suppose that u = s′. Then from the inner induction hypothesis
M′
s′
↔(i−1)M
′
s¯a,s and we can proceed using the same reasoning as in the
case where u = s¯a,s ∈ {s¯a,v | v ∈ tRa}.
Suppose that b 6= a. By construction s¯b,tR′b = s
a,tR
a,t
b ∪ {s¯
b,t}. Suppose
that u = s¯b,t . By construction sa,t ∈ sa,tR′b and by the induction hypothe-
sis M′
s¯b,t
↔(i−1)M
′
sa,t
. Suppose that u ∈ sa,tRa,tb ⊆ s
a,tR′b. Then we trivially
have that M′
u
↔M′
u
.
back-i-b Follows similar reasoning to forth-i-b.
(iii) For every a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa, u ∈ S
a,t , v ∈ S: if Ma,t
u
↔iMv then M
′
u
↔iMv .
Suppose that Ma,tu ↔iMv .
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atoms As Ma,t
u
↔iMv then ⊢ pre
a,t(u) ↔ pre(v). By construction
pre′(u) = prea,t(u) and therefore ⊢ pre′(u)↔ pre(v).
forth-i-b Suppose that 0 < i ≤ n− 1. Let w ∈ uR′b.
Suppose that u 6= sa,t or b = a. By construction uR′a = uR
a,t
a and so
w ∈ uRa,ta . As w ∈ uR
a,t
a then by forth-i-b there exists x ∈ vRb such that
Ma,tw ↔(i−1)Mx . By the induction hypothesis M
′
w
↔(i−1)Mx .
Suppose that u = sa,t and b 6= a. By construction sa,tR′a = s
a,tRa,ta ∪
{s¯a,t}. Suppose that w ∈ sa,tRa,ta . We proceed using the same reasoning
as above, where w ∈ uRa,ta . Suppose that w = s¯
a,t . By the induction hy-
pothesisM′
s¯a,t
↔(i−1)M
′
sa,t
and we proceed using the same reasoning above,
where w = sa,t ∈ sa,tRa,ta .
back-i-b Follows similar reasoning to forth-i-b.
Therefore for every a ∈ A, t ∈ sRa we have that M
′
s′
↔(n−1)Ms and
M′
s¯a,t
↔(n−1)Mt . We can now show that Ms′↔nMs by using the same rea-
soning as the proof for Proposition 6.3, using the (n − 1)-bisimilar M′
s¯a,t
in
place of corresponding M′
st
states. ✷
Corollary 6.13 Let M
s
∈ AM S5 . Then for every ϕ ∈ L⊗ there exists α ∈
L?
act such that S5⊗ [Ms ]ϕ↔ [τ(α)]ϕ.
Corollary 6.14 Let ϕ ∈ L⊗. Then there exists ϕ′ ∈ L? such that for every
Ms ∈ S5 : Ms S5⊗ ϕ if and only if Ms S5? ϕ
′.
7 Synthesis
In the following subsections we give a computational method for synthesising
action formulae to achieve epistemic goals, whenever those goals are achievable.
We note that the notion of when an epistemic goal is achievable is captured
by the refinement quantifiers of refinement modal logic [14,10], which are also
included in the arbitrary action formula logic, and so in this section we will refer
to the full arbitrary action formula logic, keeping in mind the correspondence
with arbitrary action model logic mentioned in Section 4.
7.1 K
Proposition 7.1 For every ϕ ∈ L? there exists α ∈ L?act such that ⊢ [α]ϕ
and ⊢ ∃ϕ→ 〈α〉ϕ.
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume that ϕ is in disjunctive normal
form. We proceed by induction on the structure of ϕ.
Suppose that ϕ = ψ∨χ. By the induction hypothesis there exists αψ, αχ ∈
L?
act such that ⊢ [αψ ]ψ, ⊢ ∃ψ → 〈αψ〉ψ, ⊢ [αχ]χ and ⊢ ∃χ → 〈αχ〉χ. Let
α = αψ ⊔ αχ. Then:
⊢ [αψ ](ψ ∨ χ) ∧ [αχ](ψ ∨ χ) (9)
⊢ [αψ ⊔ αχ](ψ ∨ χ) (10)
(9) follows from the induction hypothesis and (10) follows from LU.
Further:
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⊢ (∃ψ ∨ ∃χ)→ (〈αψ〉(ψ ∨ χ) ∨ 〈αχ〉(ψ ∨ χ)) (11)
⊢ (∃ψ ∨ ∃χ)→ 〈αψ ⊔ αχ〉(ψ ∨ χ) (12)
⊢ ∃(ψ ∨ χ)→ 〈αψ ⊔ αχ〉(ψ ∨ χ) (13)
(11) follows from the induction hypothesis, (12) follows from LU and (13)
follows from R.
Suppose that ϕ = pi∧
∧
b∈B⊆A∇bΓb. By the induction hypothesis for every
b ∈ B, γ ∈ Γb there exists αγ ∈ L?act such that ⊢ [αγ ]γ and ⊢ ∃γ → 〈αγ〉γ.
Let α =?∃ϕ⊗
⊗
b∈B Lb(
⊔
γ∈Γb
αγ).
Then for every b ∈ B:
⊢ [
⊔
γ∈Γb
αγ ]
∨
γ∈Γ
γ (14)
⊢b[
⊔
γ∈Γb
αγ ]
∨
γ∈Γ
γ (15)
⊢ [Lb(
⊔
γ∈Γb
αγ)]b
∨
γ∈Γ
γ (16)
⊢ [
⊗
c∈B
Lc(
⊔
γ∈Γc
αγ)]b
∨
γ∈Γ
γ (17)
⊢ [?∃ϕ][
⊗
c∈B
Lc(
⊔
γ∈Γc
αγ)]b
∨
γ∈Γ
γ (18)
⊢ [?∃ϕ⊗
⊗
c∈B
Lc(
⊔
γ∈Γc
αγ)]b
∨
γ∈Γ
γ (19)
(14) follows from the induction hypothesis and LU, (15) follows from NecK,
(16) follows from LK1, (17) follows from LK2 and LS, (18) follows fromNecL
and (19) follows from LS.
Further:
⊢ ∃ϕ→
∧
b∈B,γ∈Γb
✸b∃γ (20)
⊢ ∃ϕ→
∧
b∈B,γ∈Γb
✸b〈α
γ〉γ (21)
⊢ ∃ϕ→
∧
b∈B,γ∈Γb
✸b〈
⊔
γ′∈Γb
αγ
′
〉γ (22)
⊢ ∃ϕ→ 〈
⊗
c∈B
Lc(
⊔
γ∈Γc
αγ)〉
∧
b∈B,γ∈Γb
✸bγ (23)
⊢ ∃ϕ→ 〈?∃ϕ⊗
⊗
c∈B
Lc(
⊔
γ∈Γc
αγ)〉
∧
b∈B,γ∈Γb
✸bγ (24)
⊢ [?∃ϕ⊗
⊗
c∈B
Lc(
⊔
γ∈Γc
αγ)]
∧
b∈B,γ∈Γb
✸bγ (25)
⊢ [?∃ϕ⊗
⊗
c∈B
Lc(
⊔
γ∈Γc
αγ)](pi ∧
∧
b∈B
∇bΓb) (26)
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(20) follows from RK, (21) follows from the induction hypothesis, (22) follows
from LU, (23) follows from LK1, LK2 and LS, (24) and (25) follow from LT,
and (26) follows from (19), RP LC and the definition of the cover operator.
Therefore ⊢ [α]ϕ.
Finally:
⊢ 〈
⊗
c∈B
Lc(
⊔
γ∈Γc
αγ)〉⊤ ↔ ⊤ (27)
⊢ 〈?∃ϕ⊗
⊗
c∈B
Lc(
⊔
γ∈Γc
αγ)〉⊤ ↔ ∃ϕ (28)
⊢ ∃ϕ→ 〈α〉⊤ (29)
⊢ ∃ϕ→ 〈α〉ϕ (30)
(27) follows from LS and LP, (28) follows from LS and LT, (29) follows from
(28), (30) follows from (26) and (29),
Therefore ⊢ ∃ϕ→ 〈α〉ϕ. ✷
Corollary 7.2 For every Ms ∈ K and ϕ ∈ L⊗∀: Ms  ∃ϕ if and only if there
exists Ms ∈ AM such that Ms  〈Ms〉ϕ.
7.2 K45
Proposition 7.3 For every ϕ ∈ L? there exists α ∈ L?act such that ⊢ [α]ϕ
and ⊢ ∃ϕ→ 〈α〉ϕ.
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume that ϕ is in alternating disjunctive
normal form. We use the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 7.1,
substitutingAFLK45 axioms for the correspondingAFLK axioms, noting that
the alternating disjunctive normal form gives the (A\{a})-restricted properties
required for LK1 and the RMLK45 axioms RK45, RComm and RDist to
be applicable. ✷
Corollary 7.4 For every Ms ∈ K45 and ϕ ∈ L⊗∀: Ms  ∃ϕ if and only if
there exists Ms ∈ AM K45 such that Ms  〈Ms〉ϕ.
7.3 S5
Proposition 7.5 For every ϕ ∈ L? there exists α ∈ L?act such that ⊢ [α]ϕ
and ⊢ ∃ϕ→ 〈α〉ϕ.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that ϕ is a disjunction of explicit
formulae. We proceed by induction on the structure of ϕ.
Suppose that ϕ = ψ ∨ χ. We use the same reasoning as in the proof of
Proposition 7.1.
Suppose that ϕ = pi∧γ0∧
∧
a∈A∇aΓa is an explicit formula. By the induc-
tion hypothesis for every a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γa there exists αa,γ ∈ L?act such that ⊢
[αa,γ ]γ and ⊢ ∃γ → 〈αa,γ〉γ, where τ(αa,γ) = Ma,γsa,γ = ((S
a,γ ,Ra,γ , prea,γ), sa,γ).
Let α =?∃γ0 ⊗
⊗
a∈A La(?⊤,
⊔
γ∈Γa
αa,γ). Then from Lemmas 6.10
and 6.11: τ(α)↔Ms = ((S,R, pre), s) where:
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S =
⋃
a∈A,γ∈Γa
Sa,γ ∪ {s¯a,γ | a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γa} ∪ {s}
Ra =
⋃
b∈A,γ∈Γb
Rb,γa ∪ ({s} ∪ {s¯
a,γ | γ ∈ Γa})
2 ∪
⋃
b∈A\{a},γ∈Γb
({s¯b,γ} ∪ sb,γRb,γa )
2 for a ∈ A
pre =
⋃
a∈A,γ∈Γa
prea,γ ∪ {(¯sa,γ , prea,γ(sa<,γ)) | a ∈ A, γ ∈ γa} ∪ {(s, ∃γ
0)}
Let Ψ = {ψ ≤ γ | a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γa}. We need to show for every ψ ∈ Ψ:
(i) For every a ∈ A: ⊢ [Ms ]ψ ↔ [Msa,γ0 ]ψ.
(ii) For every a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γa: ⊢ [Ms¯a,γ ]ψ ↔ [Msa,γ ]ψ.
(iii) For every a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γa, u ∈ S
a,γ : ⊢ [Mu ]ψ ↔ [M
a,γ
u ]ψ.
We proceed by induction on ψ.
(i) For every a ∈ A: ⊢ [Ms ]ψ ↔ [Msa,γ0 ]ψ.
Suppose that ψ = p where p ∈ P . This follows trivially from AP.
Suppose that ψ = ¬χ or that ψ = χ1 ∧ χ2. These cases follow trivially
from the induction hypothesis.
Suppose that ψ = aχ. By construction sRa = s¯
a,γ0Ra and pre(s) =
pre(¯sa,γ
0
) and so ⊢ [M
s
]aχ↔ [M
s¯a,γ
0 ]aχ follows from AK trivially.
Suppose that ψ = bχ where b 6= a. By construction sRb = {s} ∪
sb,γ
0
Rb and s¯
a,γ0Rb = {s¯
a,γ0} ∪ sa,γ
0
R
a,γ0
b . As ϕ is an explicit formula
and bχ ∈ Ψ then either ⊢ γ
0 → bχ or ⊢ γ
0 → ¬bχ. Suppose that
⊢ γ0 → bχ. Then for every γ ∈ Γb we have ⊢ γ → bχ. By the outer
induction hypothesis ⊢ [Mb,γ
sb,γ
]γ and so ⊢ [Mb,γ
sb,γ
]χ. By the inner induction
hypothesis ⊢ [M
sb,γ
]χ. As γ0 ∈ Γb then ⊢ [M
sb,γ
0 ]χ and so by the inner
induction hypothesis ⊢ [Ms ]χ. So ⊢ [MsR
b
]χ and therefore ⊢ [Ms ]bχ
follows from AK. By the outer induction hypothesis ⊢ [Ma,γ
0
sa,γ
0 ]γ
0 and
so ⊢ [Ma,γ
0
sa,γ
0 ]bχ. From AK we have ⊢ ∃γ
0 → b[M
a,γ0
sa,γ
0
R
a,γ0
b
]χ. By
the inner induction hypothesis ⊢ [Ma,γ
0
sa,γ
0
R
a,γ0
b
]χ ↔ [M
sa,γ
0
R
a,γ0
b
]χ. and as
⊢ [M
s
]χ then ⊢ [M
s¯a,γ
0 ]χ. So we have ⊢ [M
a,γ0
sa,γ
0
R
a,γ0
b
]χ ↔ [M
s¯a,γ
0
R
b
]χ and
⊢ ∃γ0 → b[M
s¯a,γ
0
R
b
]χ and so ⊢ [M
s¯a,γ
0 ]b follows from AK. Therefore
⊢ [Ms ]bχ↔ [Ms¯a,γ0 ]bχ. Suppose that ⊢ γ
0 → ¬bχ. A dual argument
can be used to show that ⊢ ¬[M
s
]bχ and ⊢ ¬[M
s¯a,γ
0 ]bχ and therefore
⊢ [M
s
]bχ↔ [M
s¯a,γ
0 ]bχ.
(ii) For every a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γa: ⊢ [Ms¯a,γ ]ψ ↔ [Msa,γ ]ψ.
Suppose that ψ = p where p ∈ P . This follows trivially from AP.
Suppose that ψ = ¬χ or that ψ = χ1 ∧ χ2. These cases follow trivially
from the induction hypothesis.
Suppose that ψ = aχ. By construction s¯
a,γRa = {s} ∪ {s¯
a,γ | δ ∈ Γa}
and sa,γRa = s
a,γRa,γa . As ϕ is an explicit formula andaχ ∈ Ψ then either
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⊢ γ → aχ or ⊢ γ → ¬aχ. Suppose that ⊢ γ → aχ. Then for every δ ∈
Γa we have ⊢ δ → aχ. By the outer induction hypothesis ⊢ [M
a,δ
sa,δ
]δ and
so ⊢ [Ma,δ
sa,δ
]χ. By the inner induction hypothesis ⊢ [M
sa,δ
]χ and ⊢ [M
s¯a,δ
]χ.
As γ0 ∈ Γa then ⊢ [M
s¯a,γ
0 ]χ and by the inner induction hypothesis ⊢
[M
s
]χ. So ⊢ [M
s¯a,γRa
]χ and therefore ⊢ [M
s¯a,γ
]aχ follows from AK. By
the outer induction hypothesis ⊢ [Ma,γsa,γ ]γ and so ⊢ [M
a,γ
sa,γ ]aχ. From
AK we have ⊢ ∃γ → a[M
a,γ
sa,γR
a,γ
a
]χ. By the inner induction hypothesis
⊢ [Ma,γ
sa,γR
a,γ
a
]χ↔ [M
sa,γR
a,γ
a
]χ so ⊢ ∃γ → a[Msa,γRa ]χ and so ⊢ [Msa,γ ]aχ
follows from AK.
Suppose that ⊢ γ → ¬bχ where b 6= a. Therefore ⊢ [Ms¯a,γ ]aχ ↔
[M
sa,γ
]aχ. A dual argument can be used to show that ⊢ ¬[Ms¯a,γ ]aχ
and ⊢ ¬[Msa,γ ]aχ and therefore ⊢ [Ms¯a,γ ]aχ↔ [Msa,γ ]aχ.
Suppose that ψ = bχ where b 6= a. By construction s¯
a,γRb = s
a,γRb
and pre(¯sa,γ) = pre(sa,γ) and so ⊢ [M
s¯a,γ
]bχ ↔ [Msa,γ ]bχ follows from
AK trivially.
(iii) For every a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γa, u ∈ Sa,γ : ⊢ [Mu ]ψ ↔ [M
a,γ
u
]ψ.
Suppose that ψ = p where p ∈ P . This follows trivially from AP.
Suppose that ψ = ¬χ or that ψ = χ1 ∧ χ2. These cases follow trivially
from the induction hypothesis.
Suppose that ψ = aχ. By construction uRa = uR
a,γ
a and pre(u) =
prea,γ(u) and so ⊢ [M
u
]aχ ↔ [Ma,γu ]aχ follows from AK and the in-
duction hypothesis trivially.
Suppose that ψ = bχ where b 6= a. By construction uRa = uR
a,γ
a
or uRa = {s¯
a,γ} ∪ uRa,γa and pre(u) = pre
a,γ(u) and so ⊢ [M
u
]bχ ↔
[Ma,γ
u
]bχ follows from AK and the induction hypothesis trivially.
Therefore for every a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γa we have that ⊢ [Msa,γ ]γ and ⊢ [Ms ]γ
0.
Therefore for every a ∈ A we have ⊢ [M
sRa
]
∨
γ∈Γa
γ and so from AK we have
that ⊢ [Ms ]a
∨
γ∈Γa
γ.
As ϕ is an explicit formula, from RDist, RS5 and RComm we have
that ∃ϕ → pi ∧
∧
a∈A,γ∈Γa ✸a
∃γ. By construction for every a ∈ A, γ ∈
Γa we have pre(¯s
a,γ) = ∃γ and from above we have ⊢ [Msa,γ ]γ therefore
⊢ ∃ϕ → pi ∧
∧
a∈A,γ∈Γa ✸a
〈M
s¯a,γ
〉γ. Therefore by AK we have ⊢ ∃ϕ →
〈Ms〉(pi∧
∧
a∈A,γ∈Γa ✸a
γ). From above we have ⊢ [Ms ]a
∨
γ∈Γa
γ and therefore
⊢ ∃ϕ→ [M
s
]ϕ. As ⊢ ϕ→ γ0 then ⊢ ∃ϕ→ ∃γ0 and so ⊢ ∃ϕ→ 〈M
s
〉ϕ.
Let α′ =?∃ϕ ⊗ α. By LS we have ⊢ [α′]ϕ ↔ [?∃ϕ][α]ϕ. By LT we have ⊢
[α′]ϕ↔ (∃ϕ→ [α]ϕ). From above we have ⊢ ∃ϕ→ [α]ϕ and therefore ⊢ [α′]ϕ.
By LS we have ⊢ 〈α′〉ϕ↔ 〈?∃ϕ〉〈α〉ϕ. By LT we have ⊢ 〈α′〉ϕ↔ (∃ϕ∧ 〈α〉ϕ).
From above we have ⊢ ∃ϕ→ 〈α〉ϕ and therefore ⊢ ∃ϕ→ 〈α′〉ϕ. ✷
Corollary 7.6 For every Ms ∈ S5 and ϕ ∈ L⊗∀: Ms  ∃ϕ if and only if there
exists Ms ∈ AM S5 such that Ms  〈Ms〉ϕ.
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8 Related work
Several other papers have addressed the problem of describing and reasoning
about epistemic actions. One of the most important works in this area is the
work of Baltag, Moss and Solecki [8] which introduced the notion of action
model logic, building on the earlier work of Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [17]. In
later work Baltag and Moss extended action model logic to consider epistemic
programs [7] which are expressions built from action models using such oper-
ators as sequential composition, non-deterministic choice and iteration. The
atoms of these programs are action models, so the approach is still inherently
semantic in nature. The logic is unable to decompose the program beyond the
level of the atoms, which themselves may be complex semantic objects.
The relational actions of van Ditmarsch [12] provides a syntactic mechanism
for describing an epistemic action, and provides the foundation for a lot of the
work presented in this paper. The relational actions are constructed using
essentially the same operators as in the language of action formulae. While the
language is very similar, the semantics given are quite different [16]. In the
logic of epistemic actions the semantics are given in such a way that worlds in
a model are specified with respect to subsets of agents, so that the model is
restricted to agents for whom the epistemic action was applied. The semantics
were also specific to S5 , and non-trivial to generalise to other epistemic logics.
A version of relational actions with concurrency is able to describe any S5
action model, although it is unknown whether the expressivity of concurrent
relational actions is greater than that of action models [6]. Here we have
generalised the approach and provided a correspondence theorem for action
model logic. This has allowed us to retain the more familiar semantics of
epistemic logic, generalise the logic to K and K45 as well as access existing
synthesis results for dynamic epistemic logic [19].
The synthesis result presented here is built on the work of Hales [19] which
gave a method to build an action model to satisfy a given epistemic goal.
This construction inspired the syntactic description of epistemic actions and
approach that we have used in this paper.
Related synthesis results have been given by Aucher, et al. [2,3,4] which
presents an event model language and uses it to give a thorough exploration of
the relationship between epistemic models, action models and epistemic goals.
Aucher defines a logic for action models and provides calculi to describe epis-
temic progression (what is true after executing a given action in a given model)
epistemic regression (what is the most general precondition for an epistemic ac-
tion given an epistemic goal) and epistemic planning (what action is sufficient
to achieve an epistemic goal given some precondition). In future work we hope
to extend the correspondence between action formula logic and action models
to include Aucher’s event model language.
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